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Abstract — With the rapid technological development of 
wireless, wireless mesh network (WMN) is one of the 
network models which is gradually showing its 
superiority through several applications and projects 
thus it is becoming the key of technology for IoT. Due to 
the vulnerable environment, limited resource and open 
communication channel, the security design for such 
networks are significantly challenging. By using real-
time synchronization method between transceiver 
devices in the WMNs, we propose an algorithm based on 
secret sharing method in which each node generate its 
key depend on its physical information and the real-time 
clock. Therefore, we can manage efficiently public and 
private keys for data encryption and prevent several 
external attacks to WMNs. We also propose a specific 
protocol to secure our keys while transferring between 
devices to prevent internal attacks. 
 
Index Terms— Wireless Mesh Network, key management, 
wireless encryption, secret sharing, cryptography. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) are well-known 
technology for the Internet of Things (IoT). More and more 
applications are widely developed based on WMNs systems, 
such as indoor security system [1], electronic devices 
management [2], VoIP system [3] and health-care [4]. 
Composed of low-cost and low-power devices, WMNs 
involve several issues (e.g., MAC [5], error correction [6] 
and energy consumption [7]).  
They have some characteristics that make them very 
vulnerable to malicious attacks. Firstly, the wireless channel 
is open with the same band radio frequency so anyone can 
participate in communications. The second is that most 
protocols for WMNs are known publicly such as AODV [8], 
OLSR [9], GPSR [10] and BATMAN [11]. Therefore, an 
attacker can easily launch attacks by exploiting security 
holes in those protocols. A stronger security protocol 
consumes more power and costs a lot of resource on nodes, 
which can lead to the bad performance of this network. In 
most cases, a trade-off must be made between security and 
performance. Finally, after deploying a WMN, it is difficult 
to perform continuous surveillance without any fixed 
infrastructure. Those are the reasons which make WMNs 
face many various attacks. 
There are many security mechanisms have been proposed 
for such networks in recent years [12]. Most techniques use 
symmetric key cryptography for security protocol. These 
techniques require a simple, flexible, and scalable security 
protocol which has focused on many phases to secure the 
WMN and to overcome the aforementioned obstacles in 
WMN. The survey written by Khawla Naji Shnaikat [13] 
explained three techniques for key management problem in 
WMN, and classified those techniques upon three phases of 
a security protocol. Many protocols are designed based on 
the modeling of those phases and criteria, typically as a 
protocol proposed by Ramu Kuchipudi called Dynamic key 
management [14]. These authors researched a dynamic key 
management method in dynamic WMNs depended on the 
idea of group key management technique. This technique 
has also been most concerned by many researchers in the 
field of mesh network security. 
One of the popular key management methods which are 
classified into group key management technique is secret-
sharing schemes proposed by Adi Shamir in 1979 [15]. In 
this scheme, a master key is a common secret which is 
known by all the authenticated nodes. This secret is used for 
many purposes such as cryptography or keyword for access 
management. Each group of nodes can reconstruct this 
master key by its private key which is only known by each 
node. Since Shamir’s scheme is simple but effective, it has 
been improved and used for WMNs in recent years. Lan 
Yunl et al presented secret sharing-based key management 
(SSKM) based on Shamir’s scheme [16]. This algorithm 
dynamically generates a different key based on different 
polynomials from the base station in different periods which 
can protect the network from the compromised nodes and 
reduce the high probability of the common keys. Filippo 
Gandino et al improved Shamir’s scheme by adding a new 
key negotiation routine [17]. This routine is to prevent the 
case when an adversary compromises a node before the 
deletion of the master key. Another author proposed a 
method to combine Shamir’s scheme and encryption method 
using only hash and XOR to reduce the overhead for 
realistic WMNs which have limited resource [18]. 
Our proposed method is derived from the idea of building 
a real-time security method combined with self-organization 
among the nodes together in WMN. We propose a method 
to manage real-time keys which is used for AES encryption. 
Also in this paper, we propose a proper security protocol 
with the above method, in which the keys can be transmitted 
in WMN of reliable way. A list of wireless network attacks 
was implemented to test the sensitive security information 
of our deployed network. 
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as 
follows: The methods and techniques we used in our 
proposed algorithm are described in section II. Section III 
demonstrates how our experiments were implemented, the 
results of those also are presented in this section. Finally, the 
conclusion is drawn in Section IV. 
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II. PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
 
Our security algorithm is designed for the purpose of 
safely transferring keys and synchronous nodes in WMN. In 
section 2.1 we will present our key management method 
based on Adi Shamir’s algorithm, the synchronization 
between nodes by real-time clock helps our keys prevent 
many external attacks. We also present a protocol used for 
transferring those keys in WMN; this protocol will focus on 
preventing the man-in-middle attack and detecting other 
abnormal activities in this network.  
A. Real-time clock key management 
The conventional key management methods are easy to be 
attacked by various attacks such as eavesdropping keys and 
data, de-authentication, denial-of-service (DoS). Therefore, 
we propose to use the real-time clock to change 
continuously private key in the key management of each 
node and synchronize all nodes in WMN so that these nodes 
will be completely independent of each other. One of those 
nodes is the network time protocol (NTP) server and the 
others are NTP clients. Because of using WMN model, so 
the NTP data are transferred quickly enough for 
synchronization. At a certain point, the nodes will together 
create a unique key and every group of n keys is required to 
reconstruct the same secret for the encryption and 
decryption are exactly. 
The process of the proposed method is reversely compared 
with the Adi Shamir’s method as shown in Figure 1. In the 
proposed method, the private key is created first instead of 
the master key. Therefore, the secret will not be detected 
when the attacker attacks on any node. Besides that, this 
secret is constant changes which will make attacks faced 
many difficulties by using real-time clock modules.  
 
Master key - Secret
Threshold
Private Key Private Key Private Key   
Master key - Secret
Threshold
Private Key Private Key Private Key  
           (a)   (b) 
Figure 1: (a) Adi Shamir’s secret sharing scheme, (b) Proposed secret 
sharing scheme 
 
The private key is generated by a unique value depended 
on each device – MAC address. A threshold level is required 
for this process. This parameter will be set depending on the 
number and installation location of nodes in WMN. The 
process of private key generation is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: The process of private key generation  
 
The reconstructed secret is implemented after each node 
has enough keys. It is received from nodes in WMN by 
simple BATMAN protocol which we will talk in the next 
section. Lagrange interpolating polynomial was used for our 
purpose [19]. This is described by the following equations. 
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If we use this original Lagrange interpolating polynomial, 
there is a security problem: attackers can gain a lot of 
information about S with every couple key (xi, f (xi)). They 
have numbers to guess from instead of an infinite number of 
natural numbers by using normal basic methods to solve this 
set of equations. 
This problem can be fixed by using finite field arithmetic 
in a field of size np S,p:Ρp  . We calculated the 
couple keys as (xi, f (xi) mod p) instead of (xi, f (xi)). The 
lower one sets p, the lower the number of possible values 
that the attackers have to guess from to set of S. So we made 
a small change to our keys generation function and 
reconstruction function by the following equations: 
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where S is the secret value which we need for authentication 
in WMN. Pair of x, y serves as a key to reconstruct secret as 
we have presented. 
 
B. Proposed security protocol 
The protocol which we use for our key management 
scheme based on the BATMAN protocol – an efficient 
protocol used to establish a connection in WMN. Figure 3 
describes how our protocol works.  
 
 
Figure 3: Modified BATMAN protocol 
 
While BATMAN advance protocol work as a 
communication protocol for sending, receiving data in 
WMN and detecting node nearby with the same WMN, our 
proposed protocol use list neighbor nodes of each node in 
WMN to work for our purpose. Every node sends its private 
key frequently to neighbor nodes, an authenticated address 
list has to be created and checked. Those work can be easily 
done by design a customize package frame on raw debug 
socket interface (Figure 4). 
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MAC  
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Protocol 
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Data 
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Delay time (8 
byte) 
Data Length 
(1byte) 
Data 
Figure 4: Proposed security protocol header frame 
 
The objectives of proposed security protocol are: 
 Encrypt the data by a secret which is reconstructed 
with keys of nearby neighbor nodes. 
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 Warn all nodes in the network when there is an 
intrusion attack in the network. 
 Send private key over a man-in-middle node by our 
frame to increase the range of our protocol. 
In order to reach these goals, we combine our protocol and 
scheme into a multithread program with the flow-graph 
show as Figure 5 below. 
 
Using Shamir 
Sharing secret 
scheme
GENERATE KEY
AES encrypt key
RECONSTRUCT SECRET
Using Shamir 
Sharing secret 
scheme
AES encrypt key
Interpolate
Initialize program
Display main 
interface
Command from 
user?
Execute the 
command
MAIN PROGRAM
Yes
No
SOCKET_LISTEN
Initialize socket
Listen on a specific 
interface
Filter modified 
BATMAN-adv 
protocol
Analysis key (data)
 
Figure 5: Proposed program flow-graph 
 
Figure 6 and Figure 7 show an example of development 
with three nodes, node 1 is within the communication range 
of the others, but the distance between node 0 and node 2 is 
too long to establish a link. 
 
NODE 0 NODE 2
Node  1= Authenticated node?
NODE 1
+ Check keys
+ Check Buffer
Yes
Node  1= Authenticated node?
Yes
Buffer = Threshold?
No No
No
Yes
Reconstruct the 
secret
Send private 
key to node 1
Send private 
key to node 1
 
Figure 6: Secret reconstruction of node 1 
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Yes
Reconstruct the 
secret
Send private 
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Send private 
key to node 1
Yes
Yes
NODE 1
Send private 
key to node 1
NODE 1
- Ask more keys for node 
0  
Figure 7: Secret reconstruction of node 0 
 
To prevent the man-in-middle attack as we mentioned 
before, we encrypt node’s keys each time it is transferred to 
the other node, so there is the problem is that how the 
requesting node can receive exactly that key with this 
method. We add a new field “hop count” to our header 
frame. This field is used for counting the number of nodes 
which help packet from the requester be transfer to the 
destination. Then the destination will take that value to 
encrypt its key <hop count> time s before sending it to the 
source who requested for more keys. The “key used for 
encrypting key” is also generated by the real-time method, it 
must be known by all nodes between source and destination 
to ensure the decryption on that node is correct. Another 
issue is that if an intrusion node decrypts more than one time 
to get the value of the encrypted key, because of this, we set 
hop count value equal 0 so the intrusion node does not know 
how many time it has to decrypt for getting the key. Only 
the owner of the key knows this hop count value. 
 
NODE 1
Hop count = 0
NODE 0
NODE 2
Hop count = 1
NODE 4
Hop count = 3
NODE 3
Hop count = 2
Hop
Hop
Hop
NODE 1
Key = 1 * Encrypted
Hop count = 0
NODE 2
Key = 2 * Encrypted
Hop count = 0
NODE 3
Key = 3 * Encrypted
Hop count = 0
NODE 4
Key = 3 * Encrypted 
Hop count = 0
NODE 0 Decrypt Decrypt
DecryptKey
 
Figure 8: Encryption the key with hop count value 
 
Because of delaying when to transfer the data, it is hard to 
synchronize the nodes in WMN with our real-time method, 
the encryption will be incorrect with only NTP system. So 
we use a buffer at each node in WMN and a field to tell the 
destination the delay time the request packet sent from the 
source to destination. When the destination receives the 
frame, it can send the key it generated at the time the source 
send out it request packet, the buffer has a responsibility to 
record all the key value in 1 minute latest. Therefore, if the 
delay value in WMN is over 1 minute, the requester cannot 
receive the key from the destination. 
 
NODE 1
Delay time = 0.1s
NODE 0
NODE 2
Delay time = 0.15s
NODE 4
Delay time = 3.1s
NODE 3
Delay time = 0.25s
Hop
Hop
Hop
Buffer
Get the key generated at 4s ago
 
Figure 9: How the buffer and delay time field work 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
A. System implementation 
We consider a WMN consisting of sensor nodes that can 
work as base stations which will help non-mesh clients 
communicate together (Figure 10). In this experiment, we 
bridge wireless local area network interface and mesh 
network interface together instead of putting WLAN behind 
the firewall in order to make our work easier. Because we 
only check if our scheme works perfectly on data link layer, 
not on the network layer. 
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Our test-security program has already installed on every 
sensor nodes, and we put them in the distance. As our 
scheme, node 1 receives a private key from node 2 and node 
3, combine with its key to reconstruct the original secret 
which is used to encrypting data. This encrypted data is sent 
to one of the clients of node 4, after decrypting, we compare 
the decrypted with the original data to see if our scheme 
work completely. Another parameter which we have to 
check is secret after reconstruction. We will list all those 
parameters in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 10: System model 
 
B. Results 
1) Secret reconstruction 
In this experiment, we set secret – public key of WMN 
equal exactly with a minute value of UTC time zone. 
Therefore, the time on every sensor nodes must be set at the 
same value. Table 1 shows the keys (decrypted keys) 
collected by node 1 needed for secret reconstruction analysis 
at the different time. We put a simple function for our 
experiment secret as follow: Secret = Hour value + Minute 
value. We executed our program on three nodes in this 
experiment. This program shows us the value of the 
generated key of each node, a number of bad nodes this 
security detected, the time and the secret which was 
reconstructed at that time. Figure 11 shows all those results 
of all three nodes at the time of 22:06. Each node has a 
different private key from the others based on its MAC 
address. But all of them have the same secret at a certain 
time. 
Table 1 
Secret reconstruction analysis 
 
Time Key 1 (Hex) Key 2 (Hex) Key 3 (Hex) Secret(Dec) 
19:45 96 C4 85 F4 26 18 64 
19:51 EC C4 FB F4 E5 18 70 
22:06 8C C4 6C F4 D5 18 28 
 
 
Figure 11: Experimental figure 
 
The secret is reconstructed exactly as the origin with at 
least 3 private keys of WMN. Therefore, we can run to next 
step – data encryption, original and decrypted data are the 
same in both transmitter and receiver if it works correctly, in 
our case are a client of node 1 and node 3. 
 
2) Data – key encryption analysis 
After reconstruction the secret completely, every data 
which is sent from node 1 will be encrypted by this secret, 
both encrypted data and decrypted data are shown in table 2. 
This data is captured at one of the non-mesh clients of 
wireless local area network node 4. 
 
Table 2 
Data encryption analysis 
 
Original text Secret Encrypted data Decrypted data 
6bc1bee22e409f9
6e93d7e1173931
72aae2d8a571e0
3ac9c9eb76fac45
af8e5130c81c46a
35ce411e5fbc119
1a0a52eff69f244
5df4f9b17ad2b41
7be66c3710 
2aa19fc0
77a19fc
046365b
5bbd288
238 
a3e345523cf008
4183a37e6a6c91
fb024b46a8fb64a
774d79bd82a39e
b1520cb96204f5
be542e18eae0b4
a809568f9ad5aef
5203c8f30fec0da
aef9e31355460 
6bc1bee22e409f
96e93d7e11739
3172aae2d8a571
e03ac9c9eb76fa
c45af8e5130c81
c46a35ce411e5f
bc1191a0a52eff
69f2445df4f9b1
7ad2b417be66c
3710 
6bc1bee22e409f9
6e93d7e1173931
72aae2d8a571e0
3ac9c9eb76fac45
af8e5130c81c46a
35ce411e5fbc119
1a0a52eff69f244
5df4f9b17ad2b41
7be66c3710 
0021ffc0
7721ffc0
0035350
0666300
62 
95e1947945cb24
fc7ca56402a322f
5279569dea7915
53e7c0cc4a9d74
556186ce3688df
c8bf5ffe4c61de8
67bd0fc3085430
8fa56dab9a8144
807b82e563ff33 
6bc1bee22e409f
96e93d7e11739
3172aae2d8a571
e03ac9c9eb76fa
c45af8e5130c81
c46a35ce411e5f
bc1191a0a52eff
69f2445df4f9b1
7ad2b417be66c
3710 
 
We had also checked if the keys are secured when they are 
transmitted in our model (4 nodes with maximum hops 
equal 2). So then we used an external node which worked as 
a monitor node to capture the raw package to check if the 
keys are encrypted. These keys were transmitted from the 
node had key format “xx:C4” to the node had key format 
“yy:18”. So then, every time this key hop, its value is 
encrypted with the key is 18. Table 3 shows the result of this 
experiment. 
Table 3 
Key encryption analysis 
 
Original key 
(hop count = 
2) 
Encrypted key (AES 128bit) Decrypted 
key (2 times) Hop 1  
(base 64) 
Hop 2  
(base 64) 
23 C4 hfr4KW0ps
EbZ94pSC
Gsn4A== 
DFMhDymPlyxoziq6k
FpFvQ0/Nxp6p7Ag5i
6H0BadTMA= 
23 C4 
27 C4 AvoyieF5O
iyFv+kqX4
YSbg== 
WLLSGdaD/ZuxwLN
uUZapgpkauYg2G8o4
8S/eYzriE8o= 
27 C4 
 
3) Security analysis 
We tested our methods to face types of attacks mainly in 
general wireless network and in particular wireless mesh 
network. 
The first, let check passive attack - eavesdropping. One 
thing is sure that if any attack nodes would not have the 
secret key of this network model is hard to decode data that 
is collected in the environment, we use ESP8266 kits to 
collect all the data from our network, the entire data was 
encrypted. We also tried to collect private keys from 
authenticated nodes in this network to reconstruct the secret 
key, but all keys which are transferred in this network had 
been encrypted with the hop-count parameter we had 
discussed before. To resolve this issue, an attacker needs to 
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decrypt those key with the pairs of MAC address and hop-
count parameter respectively in this kind of network. 
Assume that the attackers can decrypt all keys they have 
collected, there also a major obstacle to them to face is that 
the keys are constantly changing over time led to the 
decoding of the troubled him no less. 
Secondly, we tested our model with any kinds of active 
attacks, because of the nature of the connection on the layer 
2 of the original BATMAN protocol have already been 
pretty tight so almost the active attacks up to this model are 
neutralized, so the impacts of them are only small impacts 
on single node and easily detected by our protocol when 
there are abnormal signs from any nodes in our model. 
Next, we tried to use the jamming attack to our model. 
Unfortunately, we have not handled this kind of attack. So 
in the near future, we will develop our model to overcome 
this drawback. 
Finally, let see how our model handles the man-in-middle 
attacks. Because we use real-time mainly in our protocol for 
generating keys, reconstructing the secret and also detect 
abnormal nodes. So any man-in-middle attacks without 
synchronized in real time or do not have the ability to 
interact with the other authenticated nodes in the specified 
period that we mentioned in the previous section are defined 
as an abnormal node. 
To sum up, the method of attacks can strike on this 
network model if it knows how the protocol work, however, 
it requires a process to collect, decrypt, synchronize and 
analysis accurately complex from the attack nodes. 
Table 4 shows a comparison between our algorithm and 
the others over the security reliability criteria. Our proposed 
algorithm can prevent many types of attacks which we have 
discussed before – the other algorithms can not prevent 
some of them.  
 
Table 4 
Security reliability comparison 
 
 Proposed 
algorithm 
Shamir Secret 
Sharing [15] 
ECC [18] 
Prevent 
attacks 
- Eavesdropping 
keys and data. 
- Deauthentication 
attack. 
- DoS attack. 
- Replay attack. 
- Man-in-middle 
attacks. 
- Eavesdropping 
data. 
 
- Eavesdropping 
keys and data. 
- Replay attack. 
- Using MCA 
handling the fake 
message. 
 
The original Shamir’s algorithm [15] has weakest security 
reliability in this table because it only prevents attacks 
focusing on eavesdropping data. The authors of the paper 
[18] deployed an improved algorithm based on Shamir 
Secret Sharing. This algorithm prevents not only 
eavesdropping data but also keys transferred in network 
models. By using MCA, they stored a hash of shared key 
with sensor node and adversary cannot get the secret keys. 
MCA does not have any knowledge of session key and only 
known to the concerned sensor node. The more resources 
consumed by the network models if the number of nodes is 
increased, so the scale of the model deployed by this method 
is limited. Therefore, our algorithm mainly focuses on 
extending the scale of the network model with our custom 
protocol using a minimal buffer on each node that we 
mentioned in sections above. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we presented a key management scheme also 
security protocol for WMNs. In our scheme, we establish 
secured communication sessions between nodes so they can 
hide their private keys from the other except the requester. 
That means not only data also keys were encrypted by 
combining our scheme with AES encryption. We also use 
the real time value to change each node’s private key 
constantly. This has caused great difficulty for anyone who 
wants to find out private keys of WMN. Comparing with 
existing security protocols and schemes show that our 
scheme is simple to deployed and it has a better security 
than. 
There remain some problems that should be addressed for 
this security protocol. We need to reduce the amount of the 
calculations for the proposed protocol which is deployed on 
routers with small flash memory. Besides, the WMN 
structure needs to be improved in order to make the system 
model work efficiently. Thus, these considerations would be 
developed in the future work. 
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